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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines, from both theoretical and policy perspectives, 
a limited but important aspect of the patent system: its role and operation 
in supplying global demand for widely recognized health needs.  It 
concludes that although the patent system is without peer in routing 
resources to the creation of the technological needs of modern societies, 
some aspects of that system operate better than others. In this connection, 
the paper directs attention to ways in which the patent system may 
produce less-than-optimum results in the markets served by the 
pharmaceutical industry as well as to related issues about how research 
on the world’s widely recognized health needs should be funded. 
The patent system, once largely ignored by non-specialists, has 
recently been receiving increasing attention from legal academics, 
economists, and policy makers. These analysts have focused both upon 
the system’s domestic effects and upon its effects in the global economy. 
The creation, in the 1980s, of the Federal Court of Appeals with oversight 
over patent litigation,1 brought renewed strength to the domestic patent 
system. Partly as a result of this reform, academic examinations of the 
system, which began in earnest in the 1960s, have increased dramatically. 
The negotiation of the World Trade Agreement in 1994 brought all of 
intellectual property into the world trading system through the ancillary 
TRIPS agreement,2 subjecting it to new critiques from those sensitive to 
the impact of this property system upon the publics of the world’s less 
developed regions.  
Although some economists have been skeptical about the impact of 
the patent system in generating new technology,3 others have recognized 
its potency. Perhaps Kenneth Arrow’s 1961 inquiry into the differing 
innovation incentives found in concentrated and competitive markets4
provided the initial spark for the substantial attention that the patent 
1 Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 36 (1982) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000).
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 
Legal Instruments of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (TRIPS Agreement).
3 See C.T, TAYLOR & Z. A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
(1973); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 
176 (1986).
4 Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE 
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY (1962).
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system has received from economists. Later in that decade, William 
Nordhaus moved theoretical research a giant step forward with the 
publication of his seminal work on the economics of the patent system,5 a 
work that stimulated an immense amount of analytical attention to the 
patent system and its operation. Edmund Kitch provoked the interest of 
legal scholars when, in the 1970s, he showed us how the patent system 
operates as a vehicle for staking out a particular area of technology for 
exclusive development,6 a condition often critical to the investment of 
needed resources. Louis Kaplow drew the attention of the legal 
community to the costs and benefits of the patent system in his important 
1984 work comparing the welfare effects of antitrust and patent market 
restraints.7 Robert Merges took the lead in examining the operation of the 
patent system in a series of articles in the early 1990s.8 Since Merges’ 
pioneering work, legal scholars have joined others in a flood of works 
examining the patent system and its operation. Recently Mark Lemley and 
my colleague Dan Burk have provided a major contribution to this 
research with an examination of how the patent system operates in 
different industries.9 Throughout this period, policy makers were 
generating new legislative modifications to the patent system. In the 
1970s, congressional concern about the impact of time-consuming FDA 
review of new drug applications resulted in legislative extensions of the 
patent term for pharmaceutical companies that had lost initial years of 
patent protection to that review.10 In the 1980s policy makers focused 
upon the patent system as an agent for economic rejuvenation, with the 
result that Congress created the Federal Court of Appeals.11 And in the 
1990s, Congress approved the NAFTA and WTO agreements that 
provided new strength to patents and other intellectual property rights 
5 WILLIAM NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE, ch. 5 (1969).
6 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 
(1977).
7 Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813 
(1984).
8 Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 21 
(1992); Robert Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: 
Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803 (1988).
9 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003).
10 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 
98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 
note, 355, 360cc, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2000).
11 See note 1 supra. 
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throughout North America and the world.12
Currently the operation of the patent system is on the forefront of 
controversies, both domestic and international, about its effects upon 
pricing and exclusion in the pharmaceutical industry. We allow patentees 
to exercise exclusive rights—rights that may sometimes be equivalent to 
monopolies—over their inventions for a term of years precisely to create 
incentives to invent. And yet users of pharmaceuticals—especially the 
elderly—have complained so much about high pharmaceutical prices that 
Congress has legislatively reformed the Medicare Act to subsidize the 
purchase of pharmaceuticals.13 The public policies that foster monopoly 
pricing in the patent law and those that subsidize purchasing in the 
amended Medicare Act appear to be in some tension. These Congressional 
actions are in further tension with the actions of Canadian and European 
regulatory schemes that are designed to place upward limits on 
pharmaceutical prices. They are in even greater tension with strongly held 
beliefs of third-world governments and their publics that the patent 
systems of the United States and other Western nations are depriving the 
world’s poor of essential medications 
This paper addresses the broad interplay between the incentive 
structure of the patent system and that system’s social benefits and costs, 
viewed both on a national scale and, to a significant extent, on an 
international one.  The paper examines the relation of private and social 
value to investment (and thus upon the basic economics of the system) 
with a view to identifying the system’s weaknesses. It draws heavily from 
Louis Kaplow who developed a way of conceptualizing the marginal 
social costs and benefits of the patent system. It also draws from Kenneth 
Arrow who described incentives for innovation in competitive and 
monopoly contexts.
The paper compares the operation of the incentive structure of the 
patent system with other mechanisms for fostering inventive activity, as 
12 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994); North 
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 
(1993).
13 Pub. L. 108-173 (2003). Section 101 of the legislation, inter alia, adds subsidization of 
prescription-drug benefits to the Medicare program.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1860D-2(b), as 
added by P.L. 108-173. The popular press is paying increasing attention to high drug 
prices in the United States vis-à-vis Canada and other developed nations. See, e.g., Roger 
Parloff, The New Drug War, FORTUNE, Mar. 8, 2004, at 144; Why We Pay so Much for Drugs, 
TIME, Feb. 2, 2004 at 4; Josh Benson, Drugged, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 7, 2003, at 12.
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important background for its ultimate focus upon the relationship 
between the patent system and the generation of life-saving drugs.
Although the paper readily concedes the general superiority of the patent 
system for eliciting inventive activity, the paper suggests that its 
superiority may not extend throughout the entire range of potential 
inventive activity. Indeed, the paper raises the question as to whether the 
patent system is superior in the context of pharmaceutical products that 
play (or could play) critical roles in the control of certain diseases or other 
disabilities. 
The paper builds on the Kaplow perspective for assessing social 
costs and benefits. In so doing it attempts to articulate a perspective for 
carrying on the debate about the operation of the patent system and its 
application to pharmaceutical research. Drawing from that perspective, 
the paper raises at least two important policy issues especially connected 
with the marketing of pharmaceutical products and the fostering of 
pharmaceutical research. First, it raises the issue of price discrimination. 
Are laws, customs, or other practices discouraging or otherwise impeding 
the very price discrimination that could reduce deadweight loss and 
thereby increase social welfare?  Second, when should public policy foster 
inventive activity through means other than the patent system?   
Part II of the article reviews the standard incentive theory 
underlying the patent system. It summarizes the theory under which the 
patent law is said to harness the incentives of the inventor for the benefit 
of society.  Part III examines the incentive structure, with particular 
emphasis upon two factors that affect the profitability of that research: (1) 
the probabilities that the firm undertaking the research will succeed in 
obtaining a patent for a commercially valuable result; and (2) the effects of 
the time lag between the period in which funds are committed to research 
and the period in which the results of that research produces revenue. 
Part IV employs the marginal analysis developed by Louis Kaplow to 
sketch out a schema for balancing social benefits against social costs, a
schema that initially employs a linear analysis.  Part IV also introduces the 
time dimension discussed in Part III into the analysis of social costs and 
benefits, concluding that as the patent term increases the rate of increase 
of social benefits slows while the rate of increase of social costs increases. 
Finally Part IV expands its schema by dropping the linear constraint from 
its model. With that modification, the model reveals that the 
proportionality between social benefit and cost that would accompany a 
linear model can be transformed, at least in theory, into a vastly 
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disproportionate relationship. Part V then raises the question of whether 
price discrimination can remedy these welfare problems. Part VI attacks 
the welfare problem from another angle. It inquires whether there may be 
a class of new pharmaceutical products for which financing schemes other 
than the patent system would better maximize aggregate welfare. 
II. PATENT THEORY, MARKET FAILURE, ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 
AND SOCIAL WELFARE: THE BEGINNINGS OF ANALYSIS
A. In General. 
The theory of patent law is straightforward. Society benefits from 
new technology. Yet in the absence of patent protection, invention would 
often go unrewarded. Unless a portion of this newly created economic 
value can be captured by its inventor, there is no incentive to innovate. 
Indeed, in certain cases there would be a negative incentive: invention 
often requires the expenditure of substantial resources in research and 
experimentation. This failure of the market to supply the incentive to 
invent is a result of a crucial absence of property rights. 
When people provide goods and services, the property rights 
regime enables them to capture the economic value which they create by 
providing these goods and services. A producer or merchant owns the 
goods which are produced or provided. This enables him to trade the 
goods for compensation. In a similar way a service provider ensures that it 
provides services only on condition of being paid. The common-law 
property regime requires augmentation in those circumstances in which 
property rights do not provide a means for an inventor to capture at least 
a portion of the economic value which she has created. This void in the 
common law is filled by the patent law. 
To an inventor who can meet its stringent standards, the patent law 
confers an exclusive right to make, use or sell the invention for a twenty-
year period, commencing with the date on which the inventor files his 
patent application. Since the patent office normally takes one to three 
years in evaluating the patent and/or in negotiating with the patentee 
over the scope of his claims, the effective legal term may be more like 
seventeen years. For products like pharmaceuticals that require regulatory 
approval before marketing can begin, the effective period of protection 
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may be further reduced. The inventor’s “reward”, as it is sometimes 
called, consists in his exploitation of these exclusive rights. Her reward is 
thus determined directly by the receptivity of the market to her product. If 
the product is in high demand, then she is likely to profit handsomely. Yet 
however ingenious the invention, there is little or no reward to the 
inventor unless buyers appreciate it and are willing to pay for it. 
This dependence upon the combination of the exclusive rights 
conferred by the patent law with the incentives of the market has both 
positive and negative effects. On the positive side, the system ensures that 
incentives are directed towards the generation of products that people
want. On the negative side, the patent system does not provide incentives 
for products for which there is a social need but no economic demand, 
such as drugs for diseases (like sleeping sickness) that primarily affect 
populations with little purchasing power. The patent system, almost by 
definition, also does not work to stimulate primary research. In these 
latter areas (needs of the poor, primary research) alternative systems of 
stimulating research and/or invention, such as by government funding14
or by post-hoc government rewards are, or may be, necessary.15 The 
patent system also generates inefficiencies: the patentee’s exclusive rights 
permit it to charge supra-competitive prices for the patented product, 
with the result that some potential customers who value the invention at 
more than its cost of production but at less than the price charged by the 
patentee go unserved. In the language of economists, this is a deadweight 
loss: a loss to society resulting from a misallocation of resources.
Because the patent system operates through harnessing market-
based incentives, the structure of those incentives bears examination. It is 
the expected value of the patented invention that provides the incentive to 
undertake the research and development that ultimately produces it.  
Before a potential inventor commits an investment to research and 
development activities, it assesses the expected profit from that 
investment. And, of course, it compares that expected profit with expected 
14 Most basic research is funded by the federal government. SEE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: 2001 508 (Table no. 769)
15 Numerous suggestions have been made for a reward system of stimulating research. 
The focus of many of these proposals has been the elimination of the dead-weight loss  
problem. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 
122-27, 169 (2003); Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual 
Property Rights, 44 J. LAW & ECON. 525, 529 (2001).
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returns from alternative investments.
B. The Patent System as an Adjunct to the Market
Although the patent system is not the only means available for 
fostering invention, it possesses certain characteristics that enable it to 
mesh with the market more or less seamlessly. We observed earlier that 
the patent system solves a market failure: the absence, in the traditional 
property regime, of rights over inventions means that the economic 
incentives that elsewhere foster productive behavior would not (in the 
absence of the patent system) foster inventive behavior. By providing 
these missing rights, the patent system broadens the reach of the market, 
endowing it with a major responsibility for stimulating invention in both 
end products and technology. 
It is in this augmentation of market mechanisms that the 
advantages and disadvantages of the patent system lie. By providing 
missing property rights and relying upon the market to provide both the 
inventive stimulus and ultimate reward, the patent system maximizes the 
extent to which new inventive activity will be directed to the needs and 
wants that society most values (as measured by market demand) and 
minimizes the extent to which resources will be directed to unwanted 
goods and services. Throughout the operation of the patent system, the 
market plays the key role. Potential inventors look to the market for clues 
as to what kinds of products are likely to be rewarded. They gear their 
efforts according to the clues that the market provides. And the extent to 
which they are in fact rewarded for their inventive activity is determined 
by the market. The objective forces of the market thus perform critical 
roles in directing the course of inventive activity. Because no other 
decision-making mechanism can match the market’s predictive abilities or 
its ability to continually reassess and reevaluate, the patent system, which 
incorporates these market mechanisms, partakes of these advantages. The 
superiority of the patent system over alternative means of fostering 
inventive activity thus lies in its ability to harness the powerful forces of 
the market to its ends. Yet it is also this attachment of the patent system to 
market mechanisms that account for its disadvantages.
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C. Classes of Inventions and the Loci of the Patent System’s Advantages 
and Disadvantages.
In a well-known paper of 1962, Kenneth Arrow divided inventions 
into two classes.16 In the first class are innovations which reduce 
production costs substantially. In the second class are innovations which 
reduce costs in lesser amounts. The first class embraces innovations which 
lower cost so much that—were the market to be in control of a 
monopolist—that monopolist would set the post-innovation profit-
maximizing price below the level of the old unit production cost. The 
second class consists of other cost-reducing innovations. This classification 
of inventions worked well for Arrow’s paper which sought to distinguish 
the profit generated by invention in a monopoly marketplace from that 
generated by invention in a competitive marketplace, and his classification 
has has been followed by others. Nordhaus, for example, employed that 
classification, and called the first class “drastic” inventions. Arrow’s 
classification also works for this paper. Drawing from (and somewhat 
modifying) traditional legal terminology, this paper calls these two classes 
of inventions “pioneer” inventions17 and “improvement” inventions. 
The patent system probably operates in its least controversial mode 
in fostering improvement-type inventions. Here the ratio of dead-weight 
loss to profit is minimized. Minimizing this ratio mutes controversy over 
the optimum length of the patent term in the context of improvement-type 
inventions. And the fostering of improvement-type inventions shows the 
operation of the patent system at its best. The benefits of the system’s 
decentralized incentive structure ensure that adequate attention is 
directed to improvements of technologies at levels that fall below the 
threshold of public visibility but which in the aggregate contribute 
significantly to the improvement of society’s productive efficiencies. 
Probably most patent activity is concerned with improvement-type 
inventions. If so, then most patent activity is concentrated where it raises 
few controversial issues about social costs and benefits. 
16Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE 
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY (1962).
17 Cf. Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 561-62 (1898) (“This word 
[pioneer invention] . . . is commonly understood to denote a patent covering a function 
never before performed, a wholly novel device, or one of such novelty and importance as 
to mark a distinct step in the progress of the art, as distinguished from a mere 
improvement or perfection of what had gone before.”)  In using the term “pioneer 
invention”  to refer to a major invention in the Arrow sense, the text is employing that 
term in a related, but slightly different, sense from that used by the courts.  
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The patent system’s most apparent disadvantages involve the 
deadweight losses that the system generates by conferring market power 
on patentees. These losses may be a part of a system that generates 
inventive activity, but they are nonetheless a social cost. Pioneer 
inventions are likely to generate higher ratios of deadweight loss to profit 
than improvement-type inventions. In some cases, the ratio of deadweight 
loss to profit might be very high. As a result pioneer inventions better 
raise issues about the system’s social costs and benefits. Of course, the 
deadweight loss generated by pioneer inventions is also a measure of the 
social value created by these inventions. Society wants and needs pioneer 
inventions. The questions are whether patent terms are too long and 
whether these inventions can be generated with a lesser degree of 
deadweight loss. 
The public is probably most conscious of patentee market power 
over new pharmaceutical products. Because pharmaceuticals are one of 
the few places where a single patent covers an entire product,18 they may 
be less subject to pricing constraints than other inventions that are 
improvements to machines or processes and for which pre-existing 
technologies are ready substitutes. The media has reported extensive 
public concern over what are perceived as unduly high price levels for 
patented pharmaceuticals, a concern to which Congress has recently 
responded. Beyond these domestic welfare and distributional issues, 
however, the pricing of patented pharmaceutical products appears to 
create extensive deadweight losses in third-world nations. These real and 
perceived disadvantages of the patent system, as it operates in the 
pharmaceutical industry, may be accompanied by some weakening of the 
informational advantages that the system draws from its close interaction 
with the market. The system’s ability to harness market-supplied 
information that is one of its major advantages may be less so with certain 
kinds of pharmaceutical products, where in the area of critical and life-
18 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1590 (2003):
In some industries, such as chemistry and pharmaceuticals, a single 
patent normally covers a single product. Much conventional wisdom in 
the patent system is built on the unstated assumption of such a one-to-
one correspondence. . . .  Such a correspondence is the exception rather 
than the rule, however. Machines of even moderate complexity are 
composed of many different pieces, and each of these components can 
itself be the subject of one or more patents.
See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of 
Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1738 (2003).
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saving drugs, needs are widely recognized. Indeed, the patent system’s 
close interaction with the market explains why pharmaceutical companies 
do not develop drugs for the cure of diseases afflicting poor nations. Such 
products would not be profitable. None of these remarks is meant to say 
that the patent system does not work in this industry or that it works 
particularly badly. Neither is it to say that social costs outweigh benefits in 
the generation of new pharmaceuticals. Rather, it is merely to point out 
that in this area the patent system’s advantages appear less strong than 
they do in other areas. These apparent weaknesses in the way the system 
operates in pharmaceutical markets are discussed below. The article then 
discusses means for minimizing those weaknesses. 
III. THE INCENTIVE EFFECTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE INVENTOR: 
WHERE SOCIAL BENEFIT MEETS PRIVATE INCENTIVE19
A firm contemplating research to develop a new product 
necessarily investigates whether the research is likely to succeed and 
whether the revenues that the product generates will be likely to cover its 
costs and to product a profit. The ordinary lag between the time when a 
firm introduces a new product and the time when its competitors bring 
rival products to market provides a window for the innovating firm to 
capture much of the economic value that it has created. That period of de 
facto exclusivity is sufficient to support modest research and 
development. The patent system provides legally protected exclusivity for 
the longer periods necessary to justify the larger investments that may be 
necessary to design highly innovative products. 
Thus a firm contemplating a large research investment considers, 
first, the chances that its research will succeed. Second, it considers the 
probabilities that it (rather than one of its rivals that may also be 
conducting research) will be able to obtain a patent on the product. Third, 
it assesses the amount of expected revenue that the product is likely to 
generate and the costs that it will incur in producing the product.    
19 The discussion in this and the next Part considers the value of the patented invention. 
We distinguish between the aggregate social value of the invention and the private value 
to the inventor. In the next Part, we consider the social value of invention. Here, because 
we are interested in the incentive effects of the patent system, we are concerned with the 
private value to the inventor.
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A. The Probability of Success
A potential innovator must, of course, balance the amount of its 
research and development costs and its probability of successfully 
developing the innovation against the value of the innovation. In addition, 
it must also weigh the risk that a rival will also succeed in developing the 
invention. Professor Robert Merges breaks the decision about committing 
funds to research into two stages. In the first stage, the inventor decides 
whether to undertake preliminary experimentation on an invention. In the 
second stage, the inventor decides whether to develop the invention.20 As 
Merges points out, this model captures some of the complexity of the real 
world: The results of the preliminary experimentation in the first stages 
provide information that will recast the probabilities of success that the 
inventor weighs when deciding whether to proceed into the second stage. 
Indeed, an inventor is continually facing new decisions with increasing 
amounts of information as the project proceeds. Thus, Merges’ analysis 
fits nicely with a third stage of the development process identified by 
Edmund Kitch.21 In Kitch’s model, the issuance of a patent is treated as 
tantamount to staking out an area for commercial development. In this 
post-patent stage, the inventor has solved the basic technology problem 
and has won the race to the patent office. At this late stage, an inventor 
deciding whether to go forward must weigh the costs of commercial 
development against his estimate of commercial success.22
Let’s consider the probability of success in the quest to develop the 
innovation. If only one firm is in the research race, then that firm 
undertakes the research if the value of the anticipated product times the 
probability of successfully developing it is greater than the cost of the 
required investment in r&d.23 But if two firms decide to undertake 
20 Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 21 
(1992).
21 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 
(1977).
22 The present discussion collapses the two stages identified by Merges for ease in 
presentation. Moreover, it also combines inventor’s assessments about the probabilities 
of succeeding in his quest for a patented invention with his assessments of succeeding in 
the race to the patent office. Combining these several issues confronting an inventor here 
is not problematic so long as we remember that we are employing a simplifying model of 
a process that in real life involves a series of decisions, each of which draws upon a body 
of information that is continually being augmented.
23 The analysis employed in this and the following footnotes is drawn from OZ SHY, 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION  224-25 (1995). Let: V =  the private value of the invention; I = 
the anticipated cost of research and development; ; " [" < 1] =  the probability of technical 
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investment in similar r&d, the dimensions of the problem change. If one 
firm develops the product and the second firm does not, the successful 
firm acquires the entire value of the product.24  But it is possible that both 
firms may succeed technologically but only one of them wins the race to 
the patent office and thereby captures the potential economic value of the 
product. Indeed, regardless of how many firms succeed technologically, 
only one will receive the patent.25
The expected value of product development must take into account 
both situations. Since only one firm can win the patent race, the 
probability of succeeding overall, i.e., the probability of both developing 
the technology and receiving the patent, is the multiple of the two 
probabilities. (i.e. probability of developing the technology x probability 
of receiving the patent). Accordingly, the ex ante expected profit for each 
firm is discounted by both probabilities. Of course, any number of firms 
may enter the research-and-innovation race. If we assume that each of the 
successful innovators has an equal chance to obtain a patent, then the 
expected value of the patent becomes the value of the innovation divided 
by the number of successful innovators. As the number of firms focusing 
success; 1 - " = the probability of failure. If only one firm seeks to develop the product, 
then it will undertake the investment if its expected profit (B) is "V > I. Note that V is 
less than the social value of the invention, which includes consumer as well as producer 
surplus. V here is the capitalized value of producer surplus.
24 The probability that one firm develops the product and the second firm does not is: "(1 
- ").
25 It is necessary to modify Shy’s analysis somewhat when we deal with the probability 
that both firms succeed technologically, but only one firm succeeds in obtaining the 
patent. In the two-firm case discussed by Shy, the two share the product’s value when 
both succeed. See id., at 224, Assumption 9.1. This, of course, cannot be literally true. If 
the product is patentable, the first inventor captures the entire value of the invention. 
Shy’s treatment is acceptable for analytical purposes, however, because treating the rival 
firms as sharing the value of the invention is tantamount to according each of the rival 
firms an equal probability of winning the race to the patent office. The probability of this 
result is: "2. The expected value of product development must take into account both 
situations. Accordingly, the expected profit for each firm is: B = "(1 - ")V + "2V/2.  Each 
firm will undertake the requisite r&d if "(1 - ")V + "2V/2 > I, or equivalently if "(2 - ")V/2 
> I.25 Again, analysis shows that in areas of high cost r&d, firms will be increasingly 
reluctant to undertake r&d as the number of equally competent rivals in the research race 
grows. With three firms the potential payoff  is: B = "(1 - ")2V + 2"2(1 - ")V/2 + "3V/3.  
Each firm will undertake the requisite r&d if: "(1 - ")2V + 2"2(1 - ")V/2 + "3V/3 > I.  In its 
more generalized form, the expected profit for each firm doing research for product 
development grows in complexity:
n
B = 3   (n-1)!      ai (1-")n-I V/I
I=1
    (I-1)! (n-I)!
14 LAW REVIEW [Vol. xx
their efforts on developing the same innovation increases, the lower is the 
chance of success for any one firm. Indeed, as the number of firms in the 
patent race increases, the expected value of the invention to any one of 
them approaches zero.26
B. Returns Discounted to Present Value. 
The expected profit that is salient to the inventor is, of course, the 
discounted present value of the expected future returns. As a result, the 
more distant are the future revenues, the lower is their contribution to the 
incentive structure of the patent system.
1. Incentives and Discounted Future Revenues. 
Because the expected profit is realized over a period that begins 
only after the invention is fit for commercial exploitation, the comparison 
of expected profit to investment—as noted above—necessarily is a 
comparison of present costs with future earnings. Earnings necessarily are 
weighted less than the research costs that generate them because the 
former must be discounted to present value while the latter do not. 
Moreover, the anticipated returns must be adjusted in several 
ways. We have already noted that they must be adjusted for the estimated 
probabilities of technological success as well as for the probabilities that 
technological success may be rendered moot by others winning the race to 
the patent office. 
In this section, we focus upon the value of the anticipated returns. 
At the stage at which the investment commitment is made, the present 
value of the anticipated returns is at its lowest. Since the research and 
development work has not yet begun, the period in which the anticipated 
returns are generated is still some time away. There can be no returns 
until the invention is produced and in form for commercial use. Thus if 
the research and development period takes, say, three years, then the first 
returns will not begin until then. Thus, in that case, the first year’s 
anticipated returns must be discounted for that three year wait. And, of 
course, the returns generated in each year of the patent term have to be 
discounted accordingly. (If the patent application is filed three years after 
26
 See note 25 supra. 
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the commencement of research and the product is immediately marketed, 
the returns to the investor (viewed from the date of his investment) from 
each year of the 20 year patent term would have to be discounted from 3 to 23 
years). 
Kitch’s focus upon patent rights as means of staking out a 
technology for commercial development27 calls our attention to the fact 
that the early years of the patent term may not be usable for commercial 
exploitation. However long this post-patent period of development 
extends, it consumes some of the protected patent period, narrowing 
further the period of return on investment.28 Modifying the above 
example to take account of a period of development, we might have a 
three-year period of research followed by filing of a patent application, 
which is then followed, say, by a two-year period of development. Since 
the 20-year patent term begins with the filing of the patent application, the 
two-year development period in the example reduces the commercially-
relevant protected term to 18 years. So, in such a case, the first return 
would be a full five years distant from the commencement of investment. 
This problem became acute in the pharmaceutical industry after Congress 
required new drugs to be “effective” as well as “safe.” The new 
effectiveness requirement added to the delay before a patented drug could 
be marketed, as more extensive testing was needed before the FDA could 
approve its marketing. Congress then authorized extensions of the patent 
term to compensate for regulatory delay, but the extensions do not fully 
compensate for those delays.  
Finally, it should be observed that it may take time for potential 
customers to recognize the value of a new product and to adjust their 
purchases accordingly. A producer generally plans a promotional strategy 
with which to acquaint potential purchasers about the characteristics of a 
new product. As a result the sales volume of a new product may increase 
over a period of years. Revenue, accordingly, may be lower in the early 
years in which it is marketed than in later ones.
27 See Edmund W. Kitch, supra note 21. 
28 As observed above, Merges’ model identifies a first stage involving preliminary 
experimentation, followed by a second stage in which the inventive work is pursued. 
Merges, supra note 20. In this second stage, the risks are whether the technology can be 
developed at all and whether a rival will do it first. The goal of the latter stage is 
patentability, independent of commercial viability. In Kitch’s third stage, the risk is solely 
with whether the technology can be raised to a level of commercial viability. The threat 
from rivals has been avoided by the patent obtained at the end of stage one.   
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2. The Inventor’s Perspective Again.
Implicit in the discussion above are the economics underlying the 
decision of the inventor about whether to undertake an investment in 
innovation. The basic economic questions are whether the value of the 
patented invention is expected (1) to exceed the cost of the investment and 
(2) to produce a return superior to alternative investments. In making 
these comparisons, the prospective investor necessarily compares the 
present cost (the up-front investment) with future returns, returns that 
must be discounted both for their uncertainty and their future dates.
Let’s illustrate these matters using a stylized example. Suppose we 
estimate the chances of successfully developing a new product (let’s call it 
a widget) at 80%. Then we should discount our projected profits by 80%. 
Suppose further that we know that three of our rivals are attempting to 
develop this product. The first to succeed will receive a patent and block 
the others from the widget market. Since we and our three rivals are 
starting out about the same time and with approximately the same 
resources, our chances of developing the product first would appear to be 
one in four, or 25%.  Thus, on this assessment, we have a 25% of 80% 
chance of success, or an overall probability of success of 20%. On these 
probabilities, unless the expected return is extremely high and we are 
high-risk takers, we should probably look for an alternative line of 
research and development.  
Let’s add a new element. Our own prior research gives us an 
advantage unknown to the others.  As a result, we have concluded that we 
have a 90% chance of developing the product first. Now our aggregate 
probability of success is 90% of 80%, or 72%.  The project, of course, is 
risky, but if the expected returns are sufficiently high, then they can justify 
the risk.  Those returns must be discounted to 72% of their expected value 
in order to compare them with our investment and alternative 
investments. (Alternative investments, of course, also have to be 
discounted for risk). 
Let’s make some additional simple assumptions assume for 
illustrative purposes. We expect that our invention will generate revenues 
(in excess of production costs) of $1,000,000 per year. Over a twenty-year 
patent term, the total return would be $20,000,000. As we have noted, 
however, the ex ante expected value of the patented invention is 
substantially less than $20,000,000. Ignoring, for the moment, the time 
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required for research and development, that $20,000,000 in future earnings 
would have to be discounted to present value. Let’s assume that we 
recognize earnings at the end of each of the twenty years of the patent 
period.  Then the $1,000,000 for the first year is discounted by the interest 
rate. [$1,000,000/(1+r)], where r is the rate of interest.] The $1,000,000 for 
the second is discounted by the interest for years one and two. 
[$1,000,000/(1+r)2]. And so on.  The present value of the $20,000,000 in 
future earnings thus is:
20
3$1,000,000/(1+r)i
i=1
At an interest rate of 5%, the $20,000,000 in future revenues would have a 
present value of $13,850,320.  So the present value of these revenues is 
only about 69% of their nominal dollar amount.  We also must discount 
the $13,850,320 for risk. Recalling that we had an estimated 72% 
probability of succeeding in actually acquiring the invention, the value of 
the expected invention is $9,972,230. That is not quite 50% of the total 
expected future $20,000,000, expressed in nominal dollars. If the 
investment required to develop the product is substantially less than the 
$9,972,230, then it would provide a positive profit. 
Suppose the required investment is $5,000,000. Then, on these 
figures, the investment would generate a profit of $4,972,230 over a 
twenty year period. The attractiveness of that return depends upon its 
alternatives. Five million dollars invested at 6% over a twenty year period 
would produce $19,098,748, or a net profit of $14,098,748 in nominal 
dollars or $5,054,202 in present value. Thus in this case, the pursuit of the 
invention does not appear especially attractive as an investment.  An 
alternative disposition of the $5,000,000 at 1% over the going interest rate 
would be more profitable. 
Thus the incentive structure of the patent system requires that we 
assess the expected return in the light of the investment necessary to 
generate that return. To make that assessment, future revenues must be 
discounted to present value and be further discounted for risk. Such 
discounting is standard practice for investors, considering whether or not 
to undertake a particular investment or in selecting a particular 
investment from a range of alternatives. Yet the patent system is dedicated 
to generating significant advances: No patent can be issued unless the 
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invention is “nonobvious,”29 a phrase meaning beyond the knowledge 
and abilities of a competent professional in the field. The system itself thus 
courts the risk that the purported inventor will not be able to exceed the 
capabilities of his or her peers. In the most successful inventions, the risk 
factor will be reflected in the high profits which those inventions 
command. And the reliance of the patent system upon incentives 
generated by twenty-year period of exclusive rights, also exacerbates the 
difference between the return seen by observers (the dollar return at the 
moment of the observation) and the incentive to the inventor (that return 
discounted to its ex ante value).  As we will see below, these differences 
between the ex post and ex ante values are relevant in a variety of ways to 
the assessment of the system’s private and social costs and benefits.
IV. EXPLORING SOCIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS
A. The Arrow Analysis: Different Values in Different Market Structures. 
Arrow (who divided inventions into two categories30) concluded 
that for pioneer inventions an innovator would set a royalty equal to a 
monopoly return. This would be true regardless of the industry market 
structure. Despite the monopoly return to the inventor, the public would
incur an immediate benefit because the large cost savings would press 
prices downward, below the level that they were prior to the invention. 
This easily seen in figure 1 below.  Let’s assume that the product was 
initially produced in a competitive market where the cost and price are 
represented by the line PP and the output is XX. The invention reduces 
costs to the level of c. Now the inventor licenses the invention at a per unit 
royalty equal to the vertical distance between c and p.  Consumer surplus 
is the area under the demand curve down to P, i.e., it is the area within the 
triangle DAP, albeit the contribution to consumer surplus of the invention 
is not the entire area of the triangle DAP but the lesser area of the 
trapezoid PP-Z-A-P. Similarly, the social benefit produced by the 
invention is not the area of the triangle DCG, but the trapezoid PP-Z-A-B-
C.  The inefficiency generated by the patent-system is represented by the 
triangle AGB, representing deadweight loss, i.e., the demands of those 
unsatisfied customers who value the product more than its production 
29 The patent act requires that an invention pass the threshold of obviousness. That is, the 
difference between the invention and the prior art must not be obvious to a person 
skilled in the art pertaining to the subject matter of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). 
30 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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cost (0c) but less than the patentee’s price (0p). 
The second or “improvement” category requires some discussion. 
Arrow was interested in how market structure affected the incentives to 
innovate. Although his focus differs from that of the present paper, his 
analysis is useful for exploring the economic effects of an invention of the 
improvement type. Arrow observed that in the case of an improvement, 
the inventor would set the royalty in the full amount of the per-unit cost 
savings, thereby capturing the entire cost savings for itself.  But the 
revenues earned would differ depending upon the market structure in 
which the invention was employed. In a competitive market, the royalty 
would equal the unit cost savings multiplied by the industry output 
immediately prior to the deployment of the invention. In a monopoly 
marketplace, the inventor’s return would be less, because the value of the 
invention would be limited to the unit cost savings multiplied by the 
smaller monopoly output. The critical element in Arrow’s analysis of 
improvement patents, for our purposes, is the constraint that the 
preexisting technology exerts upon the patentee’s pricing power. We 
examine that constraint below.
Figure 2 below depicts the Arrow hypothesis in diagrammatic 
form. In the diagram, the monopolist’s initial profit is represented by the 
rectangle formed by the horizontal line pm1 on the top, the horizontal line 
c1 on the bottom, the (vertical) 0 axis on the left side, and the vertical xm1
intersect on the right side (or x1(pm1 – c1)). The monopolist’s post-
innovation profit is represented by the rectangle formed by the horizontal 
line pm2 on the top, the horizontal line c2 on the bottom, the (vertical) 0 
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axis on the left and the vertical xm2 intersect on the right (or xm2(pm2 – c2)). 
The increment to the monopolist’s profits resulting from the innovation, 
accordingly, is the difference between these two amounts. Another way 
the difference in monopoly profits is shown in the diagram is in the area 
under the marginal-revenue curve (MR). The pre-innovation profits are 
represented by the area under the MR curve down to the initial cost curve 
cl. The post-innovation profits are represented by the area under the MR 
curve down to the post-innovation cost curve c2. The increment to the 
monopolist’s profits from the innovation thus are represented in the 
diagram by the area under the MR curve between the two cost curves c1
and c2. This way of representing the increment to the monopolist’s profits 
makes it easy to show Arrow’s point graphically. When the monopolist 
innovates, it can capture additional profits represented by the area 
between c1 and c2 that lies under the MR curve. But when a competitor 
firm innovates, it can capture additional profits represented by the area 
between c1 and c2 all the way out to the pre-innovation competitive output 
of xc1.31
The preexisting technology—represented here by c1—constrains the 
royalty that the patentee is able to charge.  Improvements can range in 
significance all the way from one that approaches (but does not reach) the 
cost-savings of a pioneer invention to the probably more common 
inventions that generate modest cost savings.  In the context in which we 
have so far directed our attention, that of linear demand and constant 
costs, all improvement-type inventions generate a lower ratio of 
deadweight loss to profit (and to total surplus) than do pioneer 
inventions. Restated, within the context of linear demand and constant 
cost, this class of inventions appears prima facie to generate a higher ratio 
of social benefit to social cost than does the class of pioneer inventions. 
31As pointed out above, the competitive output remains at xc1 because the innovator 
imposes a royalty for the newly developed technology equal to the unit cost savings. 
Without the royalty, the competitive output would increase to xc2. 
Arrow’s conclusion that a competitor firm possesses a greater incentive to innovate than 
a monopolist rests upon an analysis that does not take account of how the incentives of a 
competitor to innovate are affected by the presence of rivals who are also considering the 
pros and cons of r&d activity.  A secure incumbent monopolist (in the Arrow sense) need 
not discount its likelihood of technical success by the probabilities of beating its rivals to 
the patent office as must a competitor firm.
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B. The Kaplow Analysis.  
In a path-breaking analysis of the patent system and its connections 
to antitrust law, Harvard Professor Louis Kaplow brought a new 
analytical refinement to the evaluation of the patent system and its 
operation.32 Identifying the social benefits of the patent system as the 
innovations that it engenders and the social costs of that system as the 
monopoly output restrictions which the system provides as incentives for 
innovative activity, Kaplow directed his attention to the system’s marginal 
benefits and costs. As Kaplow rightly indicated, a rational society--after 
determining the level of innovation that it desired--would wish to 
generate that innovation at the least cost. Indeed, ideally society should 
limit the patent term at the point when the marginal social costs imposed 
by the patent system rise to the level of the marginal benefits that it 
generates. 
In trying to get a handle on the patent system’s marginal social 
costs and benefits, Kaplow hypothesized a one-year extension of the 
patent term. A one-year extension of the patent term would increase the 
reward of the patent and thus would probably generate more innovations. 
The additional innovations generated by that one-year extension would 
constitute the marginal benefit of such an extension. But a one-year 
extension of the patent term would also impose additional social costs. 
That one-year extension would mean that all of the patent monopolies 
which were about to expire now would continue for an additional year. 
32Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813 
(1984).
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That additional year extension thus would impose monopoly losses upon 
society which society would not incur in the absence of the extension. The 
monopoly loss so imposed during the one-year extension of the patent 
term would be the incremental, i.e., marginal, cost of that one year 
extension. Kaplow also worked backward to compare the costs and 
benefits which would result from reducing the patent term: what would 
be the social losses from the reduction in innovation which would result 
from a one-year reduction of the patent term? And what would be the 
social benefits (in the elimination of monopoly restrictions) which would 
result from such a one-year reduction of the patent term? 
Kaplow forthrightly acknowledged that it is virtually impossible to 
determine either the value of new innovation or the monopoly loss from a 
hypothetical extension of the patent term. He believed, however, that the 
analytical format which he developed would be helpful in thinking about 
the issues. His marginal analysis is a major contribution. Earlier writers 
had not focused their attention on marginal costs and benefits. Kaplow’s 
format, by forcing us to consider marginal costs and benefits, moves 
analysis and evaluation of the operation of the patent system to a higher 
plane of conceptual clarity. 
C. A Simple (and Linear) Model
Let us now use this marginal analysis in assessing the operation of 
the patent system. As Kaplow pointed out, when we protect an inventor’s 
work for more years than would be necessary to stimulate his invention, 
we impose a cost upon society in the form of a restricted output. Thus 
some inventions upon which patents are granted would have been 
produced, even without a stimulus from the patent system. For other 
inventions, the costs of research and development, the risks of failure and 
the risks of the marketplace would deter the necessary innovative effort 
without the stimulus of an exclusivity period provided by the patent 
system. Yet for some inventions, the necessary period of exclusivity might 
be very short. The stimulus necessary to generate other inventions might 
be longer, but still less than the actual patent term.  For yet other 
inventions, exclusivity for the full patent term would be necessary to 
provide an adequate stimulus. Other potential inventions may well go 
uninvented because even the 20-year patent term is too short to provide 
the requisite incentive.
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Figure 3
Let’s begin our analysis by assuming that some inventions would 
be produced without any period of exclusivity, some would be produced 
with a one year period, others with a two-year period, others with a three 
year period, etc. Thus we will assume that each year of the patent term 
produces an incremental stimulus to generate more inventions. More 
precisely, we assume that invention occurs in proportion to the 
investment in research and development (r&d).  On these assumptions, 
more investment in r&d generates increased invention and the increase in 
invention is proportional to the increase in r&d investment.  For purposes 
of the following discussion, invention is measured in terms of a value 
derived from the market: Inventions carry value determined by the 
demand for a patented invention, a value derived from its attractiveness 
as a consumption good or from its ability to produce new products or to 
lower production costs for preexisting products.
Let us assume that each year of the patent term provides the 
incremental incentive necessary to generate new inventions, over and 
above the inventions generated by terms of lesser length. For purposes of 
exposition, we hypothesize that each year of the patent term generates 
such additional inventions that (in an unrestricted market) would 
generate an average of $1,000,000,000 per year over their useful lives. 
Note, however, that because these inventions will be covered by patents, 
their output will be restricted during the patent term. For the reasons set 
forth below, the annual value represented by these inventions during the 
patent term will be assumed to be 75% of the amount that it would be in 
an (unrestricted) competitive market. The monopoly restriction and 
concomitant social loss imposed by the patentee thus is assumed to be 
equal to 25% of the social value in a competitive market. Social value is the 
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combination of producer and consumer surplus.
Figure 3 above represents the demand for a pioneer invention. The 
annual value that would be contributed by the production of the product 
in a competitive market is symbolized by the area DFG. We assume that 
the product is patented, however, so that the patentee restricts production 
to X, producing producer surplus represented by the rectangle EABF, and 
a concomitant consumer surplus DAE. The aggregate social value of the 
product is thus represented by the area DABF, the monopoly loss being 
the area AGB. Assuming a linear demand33 for the product and constant 
costs as in figure 4, the monopoly loss is 25% of the total area DFG. (The 
triangle AGB is equal to the triangle DAE and is one half the area of the 
rectangle EABF.)
Year   PS             CS+PS   Monopoly loss   Value of           Marginal   Marginal
(annual)            (annual)          (annual) invention Benefit        Cost
 1 $250 $750                $250    $9,000 $9,000        $250
2 $250 $750           $250     $9,000  $9,000         $500
3 $250 $750           $250     $9,000  $9,000         $750     
 4 $250 $750           $250     $9,000  $9,000      $1,000
 5 $250 $750           $250     $9,000  $9,000      $1,250
 6 $250 $750           $250     $9,000  $9,000      $1,500
 7 $250 $750           $250     $9,000  $9,000      $1,750
 8 $250 $750           $250     $9,000  $9,000      $2,000
 9 $250 $750           $250     $9,000  $9,000      $2,250
10 $250 $750           $250     $9,000  $9,000      $2,500     
11 $250 $750           $250     $9,000  $9,000      $2,750 
12 $250 $750           $250     $9,000  $9,000      $3,000
13 $250 $750           $250     $9,000  $9,000      $3,250
14 $250 $750           $250     $9,000  $9,000      $3,500
15 $250 $750           $250     $9,000  $9,000     $3,750
16 $250  $750           $250     $9,000 $9,000      $4,000
17 $250 $750           $250     $9,000  $9,000      $4,250
18 $250 $750           $250     $9,000  $9,000      $4,500
19 $250 $750           $250     $9,000  $9,000      $4,750
20 $250 $750           $250     $9,000  $9,000      $5,000
Table 1
[figures in millions of dollars]
33 The paper employs a linear model as an entry into its analysis of the patentee’s 
situation. The use of linear analyses is common in other critiques of the patent system. 
See, e.g. Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 127, 162-68 
(2003); Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize the 
Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 123, 130 (1997). Later, this 
assumption is dropped. See text at note 38 infra.
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In table 1 above, we consider marginal social costs and benefits 
using the approach just outlined and add a number of additional 
assumptions. First, we continue the assumption that each year of the 
patent term generates new inventions whose production under 
competitive conditions would add $1,000,000,000 of social value (i.e., 
producer surplus plus consumer surplus) to the economy. And because 
these new inventions are patented, we continue to assume that the 
patentees impose monopoly restrictions on production, thus reducing the 
$1,000,000,000 of potential social benefit by 25% to $750,000,000. Next, we 
determine how to capitalize the social value of inventions. Here we make 
two observations. First, during the 20-year patent term, the social value is 
the discounted sum of the combination of producer and consumer 
surplus. But the social value of the invention continues beyond the end of 
the patent term. After the patent term the social value is the discounted 
sum of each year’s consumer surplus (that is now enlarged when the 
patent rights expire). Together, these two sums equal the capitalized value 
of the consumer surplus unrestricted by the exercise of patent rights. 
Using a 5% discount rate, the value of the inventions generated by each 
year of patent protection would thus be 20 times earnings, or 
$20,000,000,000.   
Alternatively, we could take a more conservative approach by 
drawing from the practice of investors in the securities markets. 
Historically, a conservative measure for the value of a stock was twelve 
times the annual per share earnings of the company.34 Following our 
conservative approach, we capitalize only the combination of producer 
and consumer surplus (omitting the deadweight loss). Thus we multiply 
the $750,000,000 (producer plus consumer surplus) by twelve, to arrive at 
a capitalized social benefit of $9,000,000,000. We use this figure for social 
value in the analysis in table 1 above.
On these assumptions, the patent restrictions applied to the 
inventions which would have been produced in the absence of the patent 
system produce unnecessary restrictions on those inventions for 20 years. 
For inventions which would have been stimulated with only a one-year 
patent term, the actual patent term produces unnecessary restrictions for 
19 years. For inventions which would have been stimulated with only a 
34Investors capitalize producer surplus. Since we are concerned with social value, we 
capitalize the combination of producer and consumer surplus but exclude the 
deadweight loss. 
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two-year patent term, the actual patent term produces unnecessary 
restrictions for 18 years. Thus each year of the patent term adds 
restrictions on the output of a new class of inventions--i.e., those for 
whose generation a patent term ending a year earlier would have been 
sufficient--to the restrictions imposed by earlier years.  The marginal social 
costs of patent restrictions thus rise with each year of the patent term.
We start with the most simple assumptions. Later, we will add 
some more complexity. Table 1 is based upon the assumption that each 
year of the patent term generates inventions whose aggregate capitalized 
value is nine billion dollars. On that assumption, the marginal benefit 
from each year of the patent term is a constant $9 billion.  The marginal 
costs of the patent system, on these assumptions, gradually rise from $250 
million to $5 billion. On such assumptions the patent term would have to 
be lengthened to 36 years before its marginal cost would rise to the  level 
of  its  marginal benefits. If the patent system actually operates like the one 
hypothesized, there would be little room for concern that the patent term 
was unduly long. 
I suspect that for a range each year of the patent term generates an 
increasing marginal return.35 If so, over that range marginal benefit would 
be substantially outpacing marginal cost under the above assumptions, 
because new inventions would be adding their capitalized values to the 
computation of the marginal benefit, substantially outpacing growth in 
the aggregate monopoly restrictions. Ultimately, however, decreasing 
returns would be likely set in. And, of course, a rapid shrinkage of 
marginal benefit after a rapid rise would maximize the chances that 
marginal cost would then meet marginal benefit.
D.  Ex Post and Ex Ante Values
Note that the monopoly restriction impacts society now, at the time 
that the output restriction occurs. The monopoly restriction is properly 
measured, therefore, in the present, at its full nominal dollar amount.  Yet 
that monopoly restriction engenders an incentive to innovation only at its 
ex ante value. As the patent term increases in length, the difference 
35 Nordhaus appears to have assumed continually diminishing marginal returns to 
research investment. See Nordhaus, supra note 5 at 23, 73-75. Professor F. M. Scherer, 
commenting on Nordhaus, believes that it is more plausible to assume increasing returns 
to research, followed by decreasing returns. F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal 
Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422 (1972). 
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between the dead weight loss (measured ex post) and the incentive effect 
(measured ex ante) grows.   
Thus, as we observed in part I, the ex ante value to the patentee of 
each additional year of the patent term declines over the life of the patent. 
This is the necessary result of discounting future returns to their present 
values. Because the ex ante value of the return generated by each year of 
the patent term declines each year of that term, then on our assumptions 
(all other factors remaining the same) the incentive effect of the patent 
term increases at a declining rate over the patent term. Each year of patent 
protection generates a lesser incentive to inventive activity than did the 
year preceding it.
Marginal Social Benefits and Costs
Year CS+PS    Monopoly loss      Value     Marginal   Marginal   Net Marginal
(annual)  of invention       Benefit       Cost          Benefit
  1  $750              $250    $9,000    $9,000        $250  $8,750   
  2  $713 $238    $8,550 $8,550       $488 $8,063
 3  $683         $228    $8,190 $8,190         $715  $7,475
 4  $645         $215              $7,740 $7,740         $930        $6,810
 5  $615         $205    $7,380 $7,380      $1,135        $6,245
 6  $585  $195    $7,020 $7,020      $1,330  $5,690
 7  $563  $188    $6,750        $6,750      $1,518 $5,232
8  $533         $178  $6,390  $6,390    $1,695 $4,695
9  $510         $170    $6,120   $6,120      $1,865 $4,255
10  $480         $160 $5,760 $5,760    $2,025    $3,735
11  $458 $153    $5,490 $5,490      $2,178       $3,313
12  $435         $145    $5,220 $5,220      $2,323       $2,898
13  $420         $140    $5,040 $5,040      $2,463       $2,578
14  $398         $133    $4,770 $4,770     $2,595       $2,175
15  $383         $128    $4,590 $4,590      $2,723       $1,868
16  $360         $120    $4,320 $4,320     $2,843       $1,478
17  $345         $115    $4,140 $4,140      $2,958       $1,183
18  $330         $110    $3,960 $3,960     $3,068          $893
19  $315         $105    $3,780 $3,780      $3,173          $608
20  $300         $100    $3,600 $3,600      $3,273          $328
Table 2
These considerations require that we modify the analysis in Part III. There 
it was assumed that each year of the patent term generates a constant 
amount of innovation. We now modify that analysis by discounting future 
returns to present values. This modification now requires us to take 
account of the fact that throughout the patent term, each year of patent 
protection generates a progressively smaller increment to the incentive to 
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inventive activity. 
In order to discount future returns to present values, we need first 
to determine the discount rate. In the following example, the discount rate 
chosen is 5%. Let’s consider an invention that generates an income stream 
of one dollar per year for the twenty-year patent term. Discounted to 
present value at the 5% rate, the income for each year falls from $1.00 in 
the first year to $.95 in the second year to $ .91 for the third year, and 
ultimately to $.40 for the twentieth year. Since a dollar of expected 
revenue from each year of the patent term has a present value of less than 
the present value of a dollar from the year preceding, we assume that the 
second year of patent protection generates a lesser incentive to invest in 
research and development than the first year. The third year generates a 
still lesser incentive, and so on. On this reasoning, the second, third and 
subsequent years generate incentives of 95%, 91%, 86%, 82%, 78%, 75%, 
71%, 68%, 64%, 61%, 58%, 56%, 53%, 51%, 48%, 46%, 44%, 42% and 40% of 
the incentive generated by the first year revenues. Accordingly, in the 
following example, we assume that each of the years of the patent term 
provokes investment that declines in these proportions. The figures in the 
invention “value” column therefore are also adjusted downwards to 
reflect the lesser inventive activity. If the assumptions underlying table 2 
accurately reflected reality, then the patent term would be almost optimal. 
One additional year would bring the patent term to its optimal. Beyond 
that, additional years would produce negative net social values. 
E. Making the Model More Complex 
1. Modifying the “Constant Cost” Assumption
Let’s first consider dropping the constant-cost assumption 
employed in the preceding analysis.  When marginal cost is rising, it 
intersects the demand curve sooner than when marginal cost is constant. 
Thus, in cases involving pioneer inventions in which marginal cost is 
rising, the dead weight loss will be less than the 25% of potential benefits 
of the invention assumed above in sections C and D of this Part IV. Of 
course, a declining marginal cost curve produces the opposite effect. A 
monopoly restriction in a situation of declining marginal cost produces a 
greater dead weight loss than in the situation of constant marginal costs. 
Yet economists commonly assume that a firm’s short-run marginal cost 
curve eventually rises, because in the short run the firm is unable to adjust 
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the proportions at which it deploys capital with labor.  As a result, its 
short-run marginal-cost curve takes on a U-shape.36  Moreover, a firm 
with a constantly declining marginal cost curve appears to be a natural 
monopoly.37 Since our focus is upon output restrictions that are generated 
by patents (rather than other causes), natural monopolies fall outside the 
domain of this paper. On the basis of these considerations, it seems 
appropriate now to let marginal costs either rise or remain constant. For 
ease of statement, let’s assume that the aggregate yearly output produced 
under pioneer patents is produced by firms whose marginal cost curve is 
either flat or U-shaped. 
If, for each year, most of the output value produced under pioneer 
patents is produced by firms with flat or U-shaped marginal cost curves, 
then analysis presented in sections C and D above requires adjustment. 
While production under conditions of flat (or constant) marginal cost and 
linear demand would generate the results set forth above, production 
under U-shaped marginal cost curves would generate lesser deadweight 
loss. Thus allowing production under the latter conditions into the model 
would increase the ratio between social benefit and social cost.
2. Including Improvement and Component Inventions
The ratio of social benefit to deadweight loss is higher in 
improvement inventions than in pioneer inventions. Indeed, the ratio 
appears to grow as the cost savings generated by the invention falls. The 
highest ratio of social benefit to deadweight loss is associated with modest 
cost improvements and the lowest ratios with inventions that approach 
the cost saving magnitude of a pioneer invention.  Since the number of 
commercially valuable improvement inventions probably vastly exceeds 
the number of pioneer inventions, the linear model would be made 
somewhat more realistic by adjusting it to include improvement and 
component inventions. The result of this modification would necessarily 
increase the overall ratio of social benefit to deadweight loss generated by 
the patent system. 
It follows that under conditions of linear demand, the ratio between 
marginal social benefit and marginal social cost appears to be greater than 
36 See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 224, 226 (5th ed. 
2001)
37 Id., at 350.
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the three to one ratio considered in section D. The larger ratio is due both 
to the addition of improvement patents to the universe of pioneer patents 
first considered and to the addition of production processes involving 
ultimately rising (or U-shaped) marginal cost curves.
3. Dropping the Assumption of Linear Demand
Let’s now drop the assumption that the demand curve is linear. 
Some of the current legal literature employs linear assumptions,38 but 
those assumptions oversimplify reality. Probably most actual demand 
curves exhibit significant concavity. This would likely be true especially 
where the product in question appealed to a broad public and, as price 
dropped, became available to lower-income segments of the public. 
Dropping the preceding assumption of linearity, of course, substantially 
complicates our evaluation of the patent system’s social benefits and costs. 
Nonlinear curves come in an endless variety of shapes and positions. In 
addition, there is no reason to believe that all actual demand curves are 
continuous rather than kinked, or indeed wrinkled, broken, or otherwise 
discontinuous. But bringing nonlinear demand curves into the analysis is 
absolutely necessary, since there is no reason to believe that actual 
demand curves are linear. Moreover, broadening the model may heighten 
our appreciation of both social problems connected with the patent system 
and their potential solutions. Let’s take a few examples to see whether we 
can learn anything from them. 
Many simple concave demand curves are of the form a constant 
over x raised to a power. Curves of this form exhibit unitary elasticity 
throughout their length where the exponent of x is one; inelasticity where 
the exponent is greater than one and elasticity where the exponent is less 
than one. Since monopolists maximize their profits by pricing in the elastic 
portions of their demand curves, demand curves of the form of k/x2 (or 
k/x3, k/x4, etc.) do not appear interesting in a pure form, because they 
exhibit inelasticity throughout their length. If we add a (second) constant, 
however, so that the curve is of the form k1/x2 + k2, the curve becomes 
elastic at higher values of x and is asymptotic to k2.  An interesting aspect 
of this curve is that the associated marginal revenue curve rises 
38
 See, e.g. Abramowicz, supra note 33, at 62- 68, criticizing Lichtman, supra note 33, at 130 
(1997).  Lichtman, however, recognizes the critical role that his assumptions play in his analysis. 
Lichtman, supra, at 130.
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throughout. As a result, a constant marginal cost is initially higher than 
marginal revenue. If it is higher than the asymptote, it will never intersect 
with the marginal revenue curve; marginal cost would exceed marginal 
revenue at every level of output; and as a result there would be no output. 
But if a constant marginal-cost curve is lower than the asymptote, it will 
eventually intersect with the rising marginal-revenue curve.39 Beyond that 
point, marginal revenue will exceed marginal cost for all levels of output. 
In such a situation, there would be no monopoly restriction on output; a 
monopolist in this situation would produce to capacity.  A curve of this 
type is illustrated in figure 4 below. 
Figure 4
Now let’s take a demand curve of the form of a constant over the 
square (or other) root of x. In figure 5 below, the demand curve is this 
form and the exponent is one/half, i.e., the curve takes the form of a 
constant over the square root of x (k/ox or kx-1/2). The marginal revenue 
curve corresponding to such a demand curve takes the form of k/2ox or 
kx-1/2/2. 
39 A U-shaped marginal cost curve would, of course, also intersect with a rising marginal 
cost curve.
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Figure  5
In the circumstances illustrated by figure 5, a pioneer inventor would 
favor a price/output policy determined by the intersection of its marginal 
cost and marginal revenue curves at point E. It would produce Xm units of 
output and sell them at price P. It would earn a profit represented by the 
area P-MC-E-A and the resulting deadweight loss would be represented 
by the area under the demand curve from A to B down to the marginal 
cost curve MC-E-B. 
In this circumstance, i.e., with a demand curve of the form k/ox, it 
turns out that the deadweight loss is exactly equal to the seller’s profits. 
The patent restriction thus appears more significant than it did in the case 
where we assumed that the demand curve took a linear form. In the 
former case the deadweight loss was only one half of the profits. Here it is 
equal to the entire amount of the profits. Still, the combination of profits 
and consumer surplus exceeds the deadweight loss. Let’s call that 
combination of profits and consumer surplus total surplus for ease of 
presentation. Downward shifts in the cost curve would increase total 
surplus and (since profit equals deadweight loss) would necessarily 
increase the absolute amount by which total surplus exceeds deadweight 
loss.    
The earlier projections of the balance between the social benefits 
and costs of the patent system made under assumptions of linear demand 
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do not fit these demand curves which exhibit elasticity throughout. The 
demand curves in this example (of the form of a constant over the square 
root of x) alter the ratio between benefits and costs. Inventions for which 
the demand takes this form would appear overall to generate higher social 
costs than under the earlier analysis involving linear demands. Moreover, 
other demand curves of the same form but involving numerically higher 
denominators (such as the curve generated by a constant over the square 
root of 2x or k/o2x) produce an even higher ratio of deadweight loss to 
profit. Indeed, the curve of the form k/o2x  follows the basic form of k/ox 
but it is located further to the left, thereby further reducing profit in 
relation to deadweight loss, so that the deadweight loss produced by 
monopoly pricing under such a demand is actually larger than profit. 
Curves in the form of k/3ox (kx-1/3) or variations on them or those 
involving smaller negative exponents would generate even higher ratios 
of deadweight loss to profit. In short, the introduction of nonlinear 
demands shows that the potential deadweight loss generated by the 
patent system could be very large indeed.
4. Recapitulation and Assessment. 
Let’s pause to recapitulate. When we examined the social costs and 
benefits of a patent system under our first set of highly simplified 
assumptions (i.e., all patentees possessed monopoly power and all 
demands were linear), we found that deadweight loss was limited to an 
amount equal to one-half of profit and one-third of total surplus. When 
we broadened that model to include improvement patents, we found that 
the ratio of deadweight loss to social benefit would be reduced. When we 
examined concave demands, we found that demand curves of the form of 
k1/x2 + k2 would not generate any deadweight loss at all: either there 
would be no output (because marginal cost exceeded marginal revenue at 
all levels of output) or there would be output but no monopoly restriction 
(because marginal revenue would eventually exceed marginal cost 
throughout the range of possible production). Yet demand curves of 
different shapes produced an opposite result: When we examined concave 
demand curves of the form of k/ox, we found that deadweight loss was 
larger in relation to total surplus than under linear demands and that 
under many variations of that form of demand curve deadweight loss 
would actually exceed profit. 
This examination of some of the possible shapes of demand curves 
thus reveals several matters: First, some types of demand curves 
(including both linear and some nonlinear) generate high ratios of positive 
welfare effects to deadweight losses. Second, there are some types of 
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demand curves (e.g., k1/x + k2) that are incompatible with monopoly 
restrictions. Third, still other types of demand curves (e.g., k/ox ) would 
provide the context for a single-price monopolist to generate very large 
deadweight losses.  Fourth, improvement-type patents generate a lower 
ratio of deadweight loss to profit under any type of demand curve; and 
they are likely to generate a lower ratio of deadweight loss to aggregate 
welfare (total surplus) so long as the production volume preceding the 
introduction of the improvement was sufficiently large.  
Let’s identify the significance of these matters for policymaking. In 
categories of patented inventions producing high ratios of deadweight 
loss to welfare (total surplus), marginal social cost meets marginal social 
benefit earlier than in those categories where the opposite is the case. A 
policy prescription seems to follow: Provide shorter patent terms for 
inventions with the highest ratios of deadweight loss and longer terms for 
inventions with lower ratios of deadweight loss. One problem that we 
face, however, is that while we may be able to make some judgments 
about how to set relative lengths of patent terms among classes of 
invention, we do not possess a baseline from which to set these relative 
terms. There is, moreover, a second problem with such a policy 
prescription that is discussed below.  What do we know about the 
categories of invention that are likely to generate the highest ratios of 
deadweight loss to welfare? 
The category of invention that is likely to produce the highest ratio 
of deadweight loss to welfare is likely to be a pioneer invention, as we 
have defined it. Thus it is a stand-alone product, rather than a component 
or improvement. It is likely to be a product that is desired by many people 
but one that many are unable or unwilling to pay the monopoly price set 
by the patentee. In short, the demand for the product is a highly elastic 
one. The demand curve may well be kinked below the monopoly price 
where it becomes highly elastic. Some pharmaceutical products are likely 
to meet this description. 
In our discussion of patentee pricing producing high ratios of 
deadweight loss to welfare, we have been assuming that patentees set 
price at a single level for all purchasers. Thus our analysis has been 
focused upon the deadweight loss produced by a single-price monopolist. 
Yet is in exactly the circumstances that we have identified as giving rise to 
high ratios of deadweight loss to welfare that a monopolist has the 
greatest incentive to set a range of prices, each price geared to a different 
market segment.  Price discrimination by a patentee is discussed below. 
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Here it is relevant merely to point out that patentees that are able to price 
discriminate among market segments may substantially reduce the 
deadweight losses that they would otherwise generate. The argument 
referred to above for reducing the patent terms of certain pioneer 
inventions, therefore, would not apply to these price-discriminating 
patentees. 
V. PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND ITS BENEFITS
A. In General
Deadweight loss falls as output increases beyond the single-price 
monopoly output. Such increases in output can result from price 
discrimination. Economists recognize that price discrimination carries the 
potential for increasing output in monopoly markets.40 A monopolist that 
practices so-called first-degree price discrimination (i.e., selling to each 
customer at the customer’s reservation price41) would expand output until 
all customers with reservation prices above marginal cost were satisfied. 
In such a situation, output would be at the competitive level and there 
would be no deadweight loss.42 In so-called third-degree price 
discrimination, a monopolist sells at its most profitable price to each of 
several segmented markets. It maximizes its profits when its marginal 
revenues from each market are the same and are equal to its marginal 
cost.43 First-degree price discrimination always increases output. Third-
degree price discrimination maximizes output when the demand curve in 
the more elastic market exhibits a greater concavity (viewed from above) 
than the demand curve in the less elastic market.44
We have observed above that a monopolist’s incentive to price 
discriminate increases as the deadweight loss from monopoly single-
pricing increases. Since price discrimination carries the potential for 
expanding output and reducing deadweight loss when there are 
40 See, e.g,, ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 372-74 (5th ed. 
2001); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE & MARKET PERFORMANCE 494-
96 (3d ed. 1990).
41 A reservation price is the highest price that a customer would be willing to pay for the 
product.
42 SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 40 at 495. 
43 PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 40 at 377. 
44 SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 40 at 496.
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substantial differences in the elasticities among markets, a patent policy 
that encouraged price discrimination in those circumstances would 
possess considerable social merit. Because patent policy is probably too 
crude an instrument to take into account differences in demand elasticity, 
a socially optimum patent policy would just endorse all price 
discrimination by patentees.
B. Discrimination in the Domestic Market
Despite its merits, price discrimination has not always been looked 
upon favorably in the United States and other nations.45 In 1914, Congress 
directed section two of the Clayton Act against price discrimination that 
was being employed predatorily by large firms to drive their rivals from 
the market.46 Later, in 1936, Congress expanded section 2 in the Robinson-
Patman Act47 in order to protect small retailers from aggressive price-
cutting by chain stores who were able to secure their supplies at 
discriminatorily-favorable prices. In a series of legislative acts extending 
from 1916 to the present, Congress has sought to prevent or constrain 
“dumping” which is, in effect, price discrimination on an international 
scale.48  Yet price discrimination is a way for a seller possessing market 
power both to increase its own profits as well as (under the conditions 
identified above) to mute the anti-social effects of its power by expanding 
its own output and concomitantly reducing deadweight loss. Price 
discrimination is widely practiced in the United States in a variety of 
forms.49
As pointed out above, the welfare loss from monopoly pricing is 
generally at its highest when the monopolist sells to all customers at a 
45 Two provisions of European Union competition law are directed against price 
discrimination. Article 81(1)(d) of the Treaty of Rome identifies agreements that “apply 
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage” as particularly suspect. Similarly Article 
82(c) identifies the application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions by a 
dominant firm as behavior which constitutes an abuse of its position. 
46 Clayton Antitrust Act, 38 Stat. 730, ch. 323, § 2 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 13-13b, 21a (2000).
47 Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, §§ 1-4, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-
13b, 21a (2000)).
48 Antidumping Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 801, 39 Stat. 798 (1916), Antidumping Act of 1921, 
ch. 14 § 201, 42 Stat. 11 (1921); Trade Act of 1974, § 321, Pub. L. no. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2043 
(1974); Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 92 Stat. 162 (1979).
49 PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 36 at 376.
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single price. This welfare loss is aggravated where the ratio between 
deadweight loss and profit is high. Yet, if the monopolist were able to sell 
to different segments of demand at prices geared to those segments, that 
welfare loss might well be significantly reduced.  Let’s take a look at the 
pricing of pharmaceutical products. 
To a significant degree price discrimination now appears to reduce 
deadweight loss in pharmaceuticals within the United States domestic 
market. Indeed, even at a time when price discrimination was most 
disfavored, Congress recognized its potential for good. Within two years 
after it enacted the Robinson-Patman Act to protect small business firms 
from large-chain-store competition, Congress enacted the Nonprofit 
Institutions Act in order to ensure the legality of price discrimination in 
favor of nonprofit institutions.50 A major channel of distribution of 
pharmaceutical products involves so-called “closed door” sales to 
hospitals and other health-care institutions for the use of their patients.51
In addition, pharmaceuticals are sold for a variety of prices to, or under 
arrangements with, wholesale drug chains, health maintenance 
organizations, and insurance companies.52  A wide variety of theorists 
have viewed bargaining by these and similar organizations as a route for 
driving down pharmaceutical prices. 
C. Discrimination in the Global Markets
On the international marketplace, prices often vary substantially 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and this price variation (or 
discrimination) may reduce global deadweight loss. Indeed, prices of 
pharmaceutical products vary widely, for example, among the nations in 
North America and among the nations in Europe. Recent proposals to 
alleviate perceived high pharmaceutical prices in the United States by 
allowing purchases of pharmaceuticals in Canada for use within the 
United States have drawn attention to different pricing in different 
50 15 U.S.C. § 13c (2000).  The Supreme Court has nonetheless held the Robinson-Patman 
Act applicable to purchases by state agencies for resale in competition with retail 
pharmacists. Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass’n v. Abbot Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150, 
171 (1983).
51 Dennis S. Corgill, Distributing Products Under the Nonprofit Institutions Act: Price 
Discrimination, Arbitrage, and Fraud in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 2001 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1383, 
1394-95 (2001).
52 See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 186 F.3d 781, 783 
(7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Ferro, 252 F.3d 964, 967 (8th Cir. 2001).
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national markets.53 Pharmaceutical prices are lower in Canada than in the 
United States because Canada exerts control over their pricing through its 
Patented Medicine Prices Review Board.54 Pharmaceutical prices in the 
United Kingdom are generally lower than in Germany and the 
Netherlands, because the U.K. government maintains an effective ceiling 
on their prices. Indeed, government policies on controlling 
pharmaceutical prices have varied substantially over the years within the 
European Union, giving rise to widespread arbitrage.55
Keying prices of pharmaceuticals to market demand in different 
national marketplaces would appear to be a means of both increasing the 
availability of these products to people that need them and to increase the 
profits of the pharmaceutical companies. The most obvious impediments 
to this approach are (1) the possibility of arbitrage diverting discounted
products back to Western markets and undercutting Western prices; and 
(2) engendering resistance to Western pharmaceutical prices as knowledge 
of the discount prices provided to third-world countries spreads in the 
West.56
D. Encouraging Price Discrimination in Global Markets 
It is in the economic interest of pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
sell their products in ways that maximize their profits. And price 
discrimination may further that goal. As we observed above, as the 
deadweight loss increases relative to the single monopoly price, price 
discrimination becomes ever more attractive to the seller and is likely to 
53 See, e.g., A. Bryan Baer, Price Controls Through the Back Door: The Parallel Importation of 
Pharmaceuticals, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 109, 109-10 (2001). 
54 Patent Act, R.S.C., c. P-4 (1985)., as amended. See, e.g., Michele L. Creech, Make a Run 
for the Border: Why the United States Government is Looking to the International Market for 
Affordable Prescription Drugs, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 593, 615 (2001) (discussing the 
Canadian Patented Medicine Prices Review Board); Patricia I Carter, Federal Regulation of 
Pharmaceuticals in the United States and Canada, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 215, 245-49 
(1999) (same).
55 Merk v. Primecrown Ltd., (C-267/95 & 268/95) [1996] E.C.R. 6285; Merk & Co. v. 
Stephar BV (187/80) [1981] E.C.R. 2063; Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., (15/74) 
[1974] E.C.R. 1147.
56 Bess-Carolina Dolmo, Examining Global Access to Essential Pharmaceuticals in the Face of 
Patent Protection Rights: the South African Example, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 137, 155 
(2001) (comparing the Italian price of Fluconazole of $23.50 with the Indian price of $.95) 
(student note).
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significantly reduce the social loss that results from a monopolistically-set 
single price. 
Similar issues are present on the international marketplace. Large 
variations in wealth between the developed, developing and 
underdeveloped nations means that there are vast disparities in the 
purchasing powers of their publics.  Pharmaceutical companies could 
benefit if they were capable of selling at a range of prices keyed to each 
sector of demand.57 A major impediment to the implementation of such a 
program, however, is the potential for arbitrage. In Europe, where 
governmental interventions in markets have forced prices to 
comparatively low levels in certain national markets, arbitrageurs have 
seized the opportunities of purchasing in the low-priced markets and 
exporting into high-priced markets.58 Probably a major impediment to 
pharmaceutical companies selling at low prices in the underdeveloped or 
developing world is the potential for arbitrage that such sales would 
engender. Arbitrageurs would be likely to purchase at third-world prices 
for re-export to the West for sale at North American or European prices. 
Many commentators interested in increasing the availability of 
pharmaceuticals to third-world nations, have directed their attention to 
the problem of potential arbitrage, and to the potential for arbitrage to 
discourage low-price sales in third-world nations.59 Most of these
commentators have focused their attention on the impact of the first-sale 
or exhaustion doctrine and on how a doctrine of international exhaustion 
would facilitate arbitrage. They have also directed their attention to 
provisions of the World Trade Organization Agreement that prevent (or 
appears to prevent) governments from interfering with arbitrage 
operations. They have argued that that in order to effectively prevent 
arbitrage in such situations, governments must be enlisted in the task. 
Purely contractual restrictions between the exporting pharmaceutical 
company and its third-world customer may be inadequate, these critics 
have contended, to provide the needed protection. Even the customs 
service or health ministries of third-world nations may not be up to the 
57 Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières) reports on its web site that it has 
persuaded many pharmaceutical companies to sell at discount prices in third-world 
markets. See its report on current accomplishments at http://www.Doctorswith
outborders.org/.
58 See note 55 supra and accompanying text. 
59 See, e.g., Amir Attaran, The DOHA Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
Access to Pharmaceuticals, and Options under WTO Law, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 859, 879-80 (2002)
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task.60 Rather, according to these commentators, what is needed is multi-
governmental cooperation: cooperation that involves the governments of 
the exporting nation, the importing nation and the governments of all the 
nations that are potential recipients of re-exports. 
To what extent does the WTO regime impede arrangements that 
might otherwise facilitate the delivery of patented pharmaceuticals to 
third-world nations? This question cannot be answered without 
considering both the text of the Treaty, the Doha Declaration, and related 
developments. Considered by itself, the WTO does appear to bar the 
cooperation among nations that could effectively prohibit arbitraging of 
pharmaceutical products, as the critics have contended. Article XI of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) incorporated into 
the World Trade Organization Agreement (WTO)61 prohibits any party to 
the WTO Agreement from imposing quantitative restrictions on imports 
or exports.62 Accordingly, a simple reading of the literal language of 
Article XI would, as those commentators have suggested, appear to 
prohibit inter-governmental cooperation designed to prohibit the export 
of pharmaceuticals from poor nations or to bar their importation into 
wealthier ones.63  Yet, there is much more to be said. 
First, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement permits governments to 
impose compulsory licenses on patent holders in the case of a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. At the time of the 
anthrax scare in the United States, the U.S. government considered using 
this power to compel licenses on Cipro, a patented antidote to anthrax, 
60 Id., at 880.
61 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Done 
at Marrakesh, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1154 (1994) (Annex 1A: General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1994)
62 See GATT 1994, Article IX:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, 
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or 
other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting 
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other 
contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product 
destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
63 At least one commentator has also argued that discount sales to third-world markets 
would be vulnerable to attack as dumping. See Attaran, supra note 59, at 882. As he 
himself  admits, however, the government of the recipient nation would be unlikely to 
challenge low-priced sales that benefited its own citizens, at least when there was no 
domestic pharmaceutical industry able to supply the domestic market and when other 
equally low-priced sources of the product were unavailable. 
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from Bayer, the German patentee.64 So did Canada.65 The HIV/AIDS and 
other epidemics in third-world nations would appear to allow them to use 
this Article 31 authority to impose compulsory licenses upon patented 
pharmaceuticals that provided needed treatments.
Article 31, however, was drafted without consideration of the fact 
that many poor nations lack pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. 
Compulsory licensing does not help when there are no potential domestic 
manufacturing licensees. Accordingly, in November 2001, the ministers of 
the WTO member states, meeting at Doha, issued the Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration).66 In this 
Declaration, the ministers indicated that the TRIPS Agreement should be 
construed to allow nations to import patented pharmaceuticals from 
abroad to deal with national health emergencies, even though those 
pharmaceuticals had not been produced with the permission of the 
patentee. In other words, compulsory licensing would effectively extend 
to suppliers from abroad when the nation experiencing the health 
emergency lacked its own manufacturing capability. Since many of the 
nations experiencing HIV/AIDS health emergencies lack their own 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capability, the Doha Declaration was a 
significant corrective to the unintended rigidity of the TRIPS language. 
But the Doha Declaration also sheds light on the arbitraging issues 
discussed in this paper. 
In approving the use of compulsory licenses for foreign suppliers, 
the ministers took steps to ensure that the entire production of the product 
produced under those licenses would be applied to the national health 
emergency and that none would be diverted to other markets. The 
ministers mandated that “the entire output of the relevant 
pharmaceuticals manufactured subject to the compulsory license should 
be exported to the Member in need.” They indicated that the TRIPS 
Council should be kept informed about “the nature and quantity of 
pharmaceuticals being exported to a Member, the numbers of people 
benefiting from the solution, and the results achieved, and any evidence of 
diversion of products.” And, recognizing that “all Members should have 
an obligation to ensure that the medicines in question are not diverted 
64 David F. Fidler, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and International Law, 2002 CHI. J. INT’L L. 7, 
21. 
65 Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 481, 515 (2002). 
66 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 20 November 2001
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from the Member’s citizens for whom they were intended into other 
countries,” they insisted upon “a commitment by all Members to take the 
necessary steps to prevent diversion of the relevant pharmaceuticals.” 
Second, it is not at all clear why contractual and licensing 
restrictions would not afford a degree of protection against arbitrage. The 
exporting pharmaceutical company could require, as a term of the sales 
agreement, that the purchasing firms or other organizations in the 
importing nation agree not to re-export and to take reasonable steps to 
ensure that its distributees avoid re-export. It is also possible that patents 
underlying these products could be employed as a base for licensing 
restrictions that effectively barred re-export. 
Third, patent law may, in some circumstances, provide assistance 
in curbing or impeding arbitrage. Its usefulness depends in part upon the 
patent exhaustion (or first-sale) doctrine, and how that doctrine is 
implemented in the nations involved (or potentially involved) in 
arbitrage. As that doctrine is reflected in U.S. law, a patentee exhausts its 
rights over a particular unit of a patented product after it has sold that 
unit.67 Thereafter the purchaser is generally free to resell that unit, as the 
purchaser pleases. This doctrine is reflected in the patent law of most 
other nations, producing similar results. But nations differ on how they 
treat sales abroad. Some nations follow a doctrine of international 
exhaustion, under which a sale anywhere in the world exhausts the rights 
of the patent holder over the units sold. The purchaser is then free to resell 
the product anywhere, including resales within the domestic market of 
the patentee. Other nations limit their use of exhaustion to their domestic 
markets. In these nations, a domestic sale would exhaust the patent 
holder’s rights over units sold in the domestic market. But a sale abroad 
would not give the purchaser a right to resell in the domestic market. 
Until recently, U.S. courts have tended to apply exhaustion to unrestricted 
sales abroad by a U.S. patentee or a party in privity with a U.S. patentee.68
Recently, however, the Federal Circuit has ruled that for exhaustion to 
apply, “the authorized first sale must have occurred under the United 
States patent,” a view that appears to embrace a domestic, rather than 
67 United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942) (“the authorized sale of an 
article which is capable of use only in practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the 
patent monopoly with respect to the article sold.”) 
68 Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873); Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. 
United Aircraft Eng. Corp. , 266 Fed. 71 (2d Cir. 1920).
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international, view of exhaustion.69  Even under the traditional approach, 
international exhaustion was of limited scope: Thus, when foreign sales of 
a patented product sales have been conditioned upon their exclusion from 
the United States, courts have barred their importation.70 In addition, the 
cases have generally refused to apply international exhaustion to the 
detriment of a rights-holder under a U.S. patent where the foreign sales 
were made without the latter’s consent.71 The Federal Circuit, however, 
has recently The European Union follows a policy under which sales 
within any member state of the Union exhaust a patent holder’s rights.72
After such a sale, the units sold may be resold anywhere within the Union. 
A sale outside of the Union, however, does not confer on the purchaser a 
right to resell within the Union.73 Differentially-priced sales within 
different member-states of the Union are vulnerable to arbitrage but it is 
not clear whether low priced-sales of patented products outside the 
European Union create a potential for export back into the Union. To the 
extent that arbitrageurs sought to re-export pharmaceuticals to nations 
that followed a doctrine of international exhaustion, patent law would not 
provide a means for making such re-export unlawful. Although 
commentators have focused considerable attention on the first-sale 
doctrine and issues of international exhaustion, these legal issues are not 
necessarily the key to preventing arbitrage. 
Fourth, the patent law itself contemplates the imposition of 
territorial limitations. While the law speaks to territorially limited 
assignments of rights within the United States,74 it is clear that a patentee 
may grant territorially limited licenses.75 Of course, once a licensee makes 
a lawful and unconditional sale to a third party, the third party can deal 
freely with the unit that it has purchased. If the sale takes place abroad, 
then the ability of the third party to export to the United States raises 
69 Jazz Photo Corp. v. ITC, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
70 Dickerson v. Matheson, 57 Fed. 524 (2d Cir 1893); Dickerson v. Tinling, 84 Fed. 192 (8th
Cir. 1897). 
71 Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697 (1890); Griffin v. Keystone Mushroom Farm, Inc., 453 F. 
Supp. 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
72 Merck & Co. v. Primecrown Ltd, (C-267/95 & C-268/95) [1996] E.C.R. I-6285.
73 See Polydor Ltd v. Harlequin Record Shops, [1982] 1 CMLR 677  (copyright case, 
suggestive of how EU authorities would treat interntional exhaustion issue involving 
patent).
74 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
75 See Prima Tek II L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co, 222 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Section 261 
recognizes, and courts have long held, that an exclusive, territorial license is equivalent to 
an assignment . . . .”)
44 LAW REVIEW [Vol. xx
issues of exhaustion. But if the patentee conditions the right of the licensee 
to sell for use solely within the jurisdiction in which the licensee is located, 
then a sale by the licensee not so conditioned does not convey unrestricted 
title to the purchaser.  
In a case in which a United States patentee delivers goods to a 
distributor located in a particular third-world nation for distribution to 
users within that nation, the legal analysis would be similar. Sales to the 
distributor would be conditioned on resales to local users. Sales beyond 
the mandate of the license would be unlawful, and would not confer first-
sale rights on the purchaser.   
Finally, a rather obvious means for a pharmaceutical company to 
sell its products at low prices in a poor nation while impeding potential 
arbitrage would be to limit the volume of sales to estimates of local 
demand. The principal problem would lie in obtaining accurate estimates. 
But the companies’ own marketing experiences both in the target market 
and in other similar markets may prove helpful. In addition, governments 
in the target markets would probably be willing to assist in the estimates 
of local demand. In cases where the importer was a government or 
government-controlled distributor, advance estimates of demand might 
be unnecessary. In these cases, the governmental interest would lie in 
ensuring that the purchased drugs would be routed to the patients who 
needed them, and, in order to ensure the delivery of drugs in the future, to 
take steps to discourage arbitrage. Patent law would support this scenario 
indirectly, since by ensuring that the patentee is the only source of the 
product, it ensures the effectiveness of the patentee’s limitation of its 
export volume. 
VI. CORRECTING THE WEAKNESSES OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
The most apparent weakness of the patent system in performing its 
function of fostering invention lies in the deadweight losses that this 
system generates. Generally, these deadweight losses are a modest price 
for the encouragement of invention. Indeed, since there is no deadweight 
loss at all without the development of both (i) a new product and (ii) one 
for which there is a demand, these losses are a measure of technology 
growth. To the extent that the exclusivity conferred on a patentee is 
necessary to generate an invention, the resulting deadweight loss is not a 
social loss at all. Yet, as discussed above, to the extent that the exclusivity 
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is unnecessary (as, for example, by extending longer than necessary), it 
can become a social cost.  
The pharmaceutical industry provides an example where 
deadweight losses may be large when measured on a global scale.  Thus it 
may be more of a candidate for revealing the weaknesses of the patent 
system than other industries. It also may be the case that the usefulness of 
the market in supplying information about needs to prospective inventors 
is at its lowest in that part of this industry that is concerned with the 
development of lifesaving products. It is a matter of common knowledge 
that cures are needed for diseases afflicting large populations. Thus the 
close interaction between the patent system and the pharmaceutical 
industry may be less socially advantageous than in other industries: in 
some parts of the pharmaceutical industry, market-based information is 
less needed; and, in that industry, the patent system’s market-based 
incentives carry a potential for generating unduly high deadweight 
losses.76
These considerations raise the question of whether another form of 
financing of the development of life-saving pharmaceutical products
would be desirable. Public funding of such development, if successful, 
would generate the larger aggregate welfare, since there would be no 
deadweight losses. But, to raise the question of public funding is also to 
raise the question of who would ultimately pay for that public funding. 
Well, that question, in turn, raises the question of who pays for the 
76 The pharmaceutical industry also reveals other dysfunctions connected with the patent 
system. As observed in the beginning of this article, prices of patented pharmaceuticals 
reflect the exclusive rights that the patent system confers upon their patentees. 
Consumers complain that these prices are unduly high, but exclusive patent rights are 
designed to produce such prices. If those prices are high, that is the result that the patent 
system contemplates. High prices generate the incentives necessary to stimulate 
inventive activity.  Yet when the government responds to consumer dissatisfaction by 
subsidizing purchases of patented pharmaceuticals, the prices of these products will tend 
to rise. Government subsidization of consumers increases demand and thus price. This 
subsidy to consumers ultimately results in a subsidy to the pharmaceutical producers. 
      If, as is likely, the amended Medicare Act generates higher pharmaceutical prices in 
the United States, the international problem is likely to be exacerbated unless the 
patentees sell at discounted prices in poor countries. Purchasers in poor countries now 
complain that they are priced out of the market. When U.S. prices rise further, the gap 
between U.S. prices and affordable third-world prices will increase.  As argued above, 
however, the gap between U.S. and third-world prices need not deprive third-world 
publics of patented pharmaceuticals, so long as the patentees are willing to set prices in 
third-world markets targeted to the demand within each market. 
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development of pharmaceutical products today.  The answer to the latter
question is that although they are paid for by the publics of Western 
nations, they bulk of the financial contribution comes from the American 
public. Prices are higher in the United States than elsewhere. Moreover, 
although the U.S. government does not pay list prices for pharmaceutical 
products, it nonetheless subsidizes them in its Medicaid program and, 
under recently enacted legislation, will now subsidize them in its 
Medicare program.  In short, the U.S. public (through purchase prices, 
insurance premiums and/or taxes) pays a disproportionate part of the 
research and development cost for new pharmaceutical products now.77
To raise the possibility of public funding for lifesaving 
pharmaceutical products is also to raises the question of whether that 
public funding should be shared by all or most of the world’s nations. The
entire world benefits, or potentially benefits, from pharmaceutical 
research.  Some formula, perhaps keyed to each nation’s gross domestic 
product or to its per capita income might produce both a more equitably 
shared source of financing and a major advance in global welfare. The 
result, of course, would be that Western nations would make the largest 
contributions. That part of the result mimics the present system in which 
U.S. consumers pay the highest prices, Canadian and European 
consumers pay lower prices and the lowest are paid by consumers in 
those poor countries where the pharmaceutical companies sell at discount 
prices.  This financing arrangement, however, would have the advantage 
of transparency, open bargaining, and an agreed-upon distribution of the 
burden.  The extent to which other Western nations free-ride upon U.S. 
consumers’ support of research and development would probably fall. 
The public funding of research would dispense with patent rights and the 
deadweight losses that accompany their exercise. Global welfare would 
advance substantially. Discontent in the third-world over patent policies 
that prevented or impeded their publics from treatments available 
elsewhere would be reduced.  And a by-product of this reduced 
discontent would be the strengthening of the Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS). 
77 Although U.S. consumers and taxpayers bear the burden of supporting pharmaceutical 
research, existing U.S. policy may confer certain advantages on American producers. See 
The Pharmaceutical Industry: The Trouble with Cheap Drugs, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 31, 2004, 
at pp.59-60. 
